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Deferring the Decision Point: Treatment Assertions in Neurology Outpatient
Consultations
Merran Toerien
Department of Sociology, University of York
ABSTRACT
Recommendations can be implied by asserting some generalisation about a treatment’s benefit
without overtly directing the patient to take it. Focusing on a collection of assertions in UK
neurology consultations, this paper shows that these are overwhelmingly receipted as “merely”
doing informing and argues that this is made possible by their ambiguous design: their relatively
depersonalised formats convey that the neurologist is simply telling the patient what’s available, but
the link made between the treatment and the patient’s condition implies that it will be of benefit.
Thus, assertions, while stopping short of telling the patient what to do, are hearable as recommen-
dation relevant. This delicates balance leaves it up to the patient to respond either to the implied or
on-record action (recommending vs. informing). When treated as “merely” doing informing, asser-
tions defer the decision point until the neurologist has done something more. Three main interac-
tional functions of this are identified as follows: (i) indicating the existence of a solution to a
concern, without making a decision relevant next; (ii) orienting to the patient’s right to choose;
and (iii) making “cautious” recommendations.
As demonstrated by Stivers et al. (in press), recommenda-
tions can be implied “through the assertion of some gen-
eralisation about a treatment’s benefit… without proferring
a directive” (p. x). For example, in the UK neurology
dataset, which forms the basis for the analysis presented
in this paper, clinicians regularly initiated decision-making
trajectories by asserting either that a particular named (type
of) treatment could be helpful or, more generally, that
suitable treatments existed for the patient’s symptoms.
Assertions thus “sit at the boundary between information-
providing statements and recommendations” (Stivers et al.,
in press), implying that the patient may benefit from start-
ing treatment, but stopping short of an on-record recom-
mendation that the patient ought to do so.
This has implications for how patients might appropri-
ately respond in next turn. As Stivers et al. (in press) have
demonstrated, it is possible for patients to treat assertions
as recommendations, responding by accepting or resisting
the available option(s). However, it is also possible to treat
the prior turn as simply doing informing, thereby respond-
ing only to the form of the turn and not to its implied
action as a recommendation. As this paper will show, the
latter was overwhelmingly the case for assertions in neurol-
ogy, which were almost always followed by a minimal
acknowledgement (e.g. “mm,” “right,” or a nod) or no
response at all. Thus, it will be argued that these responses
should not be assumed to be doing passive resistance, as
they can be heard to do following full, on-record recom-
mendations (Koenig, 2011; Stivers, 2005a, 2005b, 2007;
Stivers et al., in press). Rather, the analysis presented
below shows how assertions—despite clearly being recom-
mendation relevant—do not, in themselves, demand an
immediate decision from the patient. By making it readily
possible for the patient to treat them as “mere” informings,
assertions can defer the decision point.
In this regard, assertions function similarly to patients’
illness explanations as analysed by Gill and Maynard
(2006). These authors show how illness explanations, by
virtue of their design and sequential placement, can leave
open what kind of response is relevant next (see also Stivers
& Rossano, 2010). For instance, in Extract 1, the patient
responds (line 4) to the doctor’s question (lines 1–3) in a
way that may imply that prior surgery (involving both a
hysterectomy and bladder repair) caused her current
experience of pain during intercourse. She also “adds a
more overt, speculative explanation” (Gill & Maynard,
2006, p. 124) at lines 4–5, which focuses on the bladder
repair specifically as a potential cause. In response (line 6),
the doctor deals with the new information regarding how
long she has been experiencing the pain. Although he
implicitly notes the potential connection with the surgery
(“ever since that surgery,” line 8–9), he does not explicitly
confirm or disconfirm whether the “bladder tie up” may be
a cause of the patient’s current pain.
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Extract 1 (from Gill & Maynard, 2006, p. 124—see their
Extract 9)
By contrast, as Gill and Maynard (2006) show, patients can
design their explanations as “frank questions that narrowly
restrict doctors’ response options, such that doctors are com-
pelled to provide ‘answers’ by evaluating the explanations”
(p. 126, italics in original). The distinction, then, is between
those explanations that place significant interactional pressure
on the doctor for a particular kind of response, and those that
largely leave it to the doctor to decide how to respond; for
example, with “a confirming or disconfirming evaluation” or,
instead, by “treat[ing] the report as ‘information’ or ‘data’ and
proceed[ing]… by simply nodding, or otherwise indicating
receipt of the report” (p. 124). The present paper demonstrates
how assertions function in a similar way to those explanations
that place little interactional pressure on the recipient to address
the implicit social action.
Although treatment recommendations have long been of spe-
cial interest to those investigating communication inmedical care,
there has been little work exploring whether particular turn
designs may be employed, systematically, in particular sequential
environments. A notable exception is a study of psychiatric con-
sultations in Japan, which compares two formats for treatment
proposals: an inclusive “we” form (translated as “let’s do x” or
“how about x”) and declarative evaluations (such as, “it might be
better to x”) (Kushida & Yamakawa, 2015). The authors demon-
strate that the former turn design is used when decision-making
proper is relevant next; the latter, by contrast, “is used to propose a
treatment cautiously when the sequential environment is not yet
ready for decision-making” (p. 522). Kushida and Yamakawa’s
focal turn designs all fall within the broader action type of propo-
sals. Their declarative evaluations are not, then, direct translations
of any of the assertion formats identified in the present study.
However, they appear to be functioning in similar ways. As
Kushida and Yamakawa argue, although these turns are recogni-
sable as proposals, they do not create an on-record decision-
making moment, partly due to the grammatical form, which—
like the assertions analysed here—can be treated simply as infor-
mation. It is thus left to the patient whether to respondwith a news
receipt or to orient to the “less official” action of proposing
(p. 532).
Following a similar line of analytic argument, this paper
will show how assertions are poised between doing “simple”
informing and doing recommending. Exploring their func-
tion, the paper will argue that the “off-record” nature of
assertions makes them well suited to performing three types
of interactional work: (i) indicating the existence of a solution
to a patient’s concern, without making a decision relevant
next; (ii) orienting to the patient’s right to choose; and (iii)
making “cautious” recommendations.
Data and method
The analysis reported here made use of an existing dataset,
collected as part of a project aimed at identifying how clinicians
offer patients choice, and the interactional consequences thereof
(Reuber, Toerien, Shaw, & Duncan, 2015). The original project
was funded by the United Kingdom’s National Institute for
Health Research. The main dataset consists of recordings of
224 consultations collected in two major clinical neuroscience
centres in the UK, between February and September 2012.
Participants could choose whether to be audio or video-
recorded. Approvals were obtained from the appropriate UK
National Health Service Research Ethics Committee and the
participating hospitals’ Research andDevelopment departments.
For the collaborative project reported here, 50 physician-
initiated recommendations were identified that met the codebook
criteria. Each of these was coded for the features described in
Stivers et al. (in press), including the five main types of social
action performed through the recommending turns: pronounce-
ments, suggestions, proposals, offers, and assertions. This pro-
duced an unexpected finding: almost half of the neurology cases
(48%) were coded as assertions. This is more than three times the
number found in theUKpsychiatry consultations (15%) and three
times the number in the UK and US primary care consultations
combined (16%). Assertions were more common in the UK pri-
mary care consultations (16%) than in those from theUS (5%), but
clearly the neurology effect goes beyond the UK–US difference.
Subsequent qualitative analysis thus focused in detail on
the neurology assertions specifically, using the tools and per-
spective of conversation analysis (CA) to examine how these
functioned in the recorded clinical interactions between neu-
rologists and patients. This involved searching for patterns in
the design of the assertions, patients’ responses to them, and
the sequential placement of the assertions within the wider
interaction. For introductions to conversation analysis, see
Drew (2005), Sidnell and Stivers (2013), and Toerien (2013).
Analysis
Introducing neurology assertions and their responses
In the neurology dataset, clinicians initiated treatment deci-
sion-making trajectories by asserting either that a particular
named (type of) treatment could be helpful (as in Extract 2)
or, more generally, that suitable treatments existed for the
patient’s symptoms (as in Extract 3).
Extract 2 (UK050208202; Multiple Sclerosis)
Extract 3 (UK050102402; Multiple Sclerosis)
01 Dr. C: .hh Kay. An then the other- the other thing 
02           you mentioned was (.) you have (.) pain with 
03              intercourse. Is that right?
04  Ms. I: Yeah. But that's just since I've had that 
05              hysterectomy. An I don't know if that bladder tie up? 
06              Was part of that?
07 (0.8)
08  Dr. C: For th last six or ten years. Ever since that 
09              [surgery. So]
10 Ms. I: [M  hm?  M ]hm?
01 Neu: The steroids ca:n be helpful in terms of an acute 
02          relapse 
01 Neu: .hhhh There are also medications for treating the 
02 burning sensations, and- and- and the:: kind of 
03 painful and tight sensations as we:ll,
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Each of these implies a recommendation by making a link
between the treatment and the patient’s complaint(s). In Extract
2, this is done through mentioning a diagnostic category (“an
acute relapse”) that was applied to the patient earlier in the
consultation. The definite article (“the steroids” rather than
“steroids”) also implicitly links the assertion to an earlier discus-
sion about whether the patient had already been prescribed these
(he had not). In Extract 3, the link is made through use of the
definite article to index the patient’s earlier report of symptoms:
“the burning sensations… the… painful and tight sensations”.
Thus, these turns—in common with all the assertions in our
collection—are not neutral with respect to patients’ concerns; all
are tilted, at least somewhat, in favour of treatment as a means of
addressing these. Given the generally agreed right for clinicians
to “know best” about treatment, this tilt carries particular insti-
tutional weight. As Stivers et al. (in press) put it: assertions “can
carry the force of a recommendation because they leverage the
epistemic authority of the physician into the deontic force of a
recommendation through a stepwise process of inference” (p. x).
Nonetheless, assertions stop short of an on-record recom-
mendation that the patient start a particular treatment. They are,
then, deontically mitigated in comparison to the other formats
shown in Stivers et al. (in press). In Extracts 2 and 3, this is
evident in the work done to avoid overtly personalising the
information provided. It is presented as a general fact that “the
steroids” can be helpful for an acute relapse (Extract 2) and that
“medications” exist for treating certain symptoms of multiple
sclerosis (Extract 3). Neither neurologist refers explicitly to his
own view on the treatment (“the steroids can be helpful” rather
than “I think steroids would be helpful,” and “there are medica-
tions for treating” rather than “I would suggest taking medica-
tion”), and neither neurologist refers to the patient personally
(“an acute relapse” and “the burning sensations” rather than
“your symptoms”). Assertions are poised, then, somewhere
between informing—“merely” providing the patient with infor-
mation about available treatment—and a recommendation that
this patient ought to take this treatment.
Although, as Stivers et al. (in press) have demonstrated,
patients can and do sometimes treat assertions as recom-
mendations, it is also possible to treat them as simply doing
informing. The latter was overwhelmingly the case for
assertions in neurology, which were almost always followed
by a minimal acknowledgement (e.g. “mm,” “right,” or a
nod) or no response at all. Extracts 4–6 provide illustra-
tions, with assertions in boldface and and arrowed lines
showing their responses.
Extract 4—showing response to Extract 3, above
(UK050102402; Multiple Sclerosis)
Extract 5 (UK050104601; Multiple Sclerosis)
Extract 6 (UK050106401; Migraine).
The patients in 4–6 treat the prior turns as nothing more
than informing, to be—at most—simply acknowledged (see
Gardner, 1997, 2001, 2007). They neither actively accept nor
actively resist the implied recommendation for the medica-
tions just introduced. Crucially, such minimal responses
occurred routinely after neurology assertions, regardless of
whether the patient went on to accept or resist a treatment
option.
The rest of the analysis presented here explores the function
of the neurology assertions, arguing that their “off-record”
nature makes them well suited to performing three types of
interactional work, each of which is discussed below.
Indicating the existence of a solution to a patient’s
concern
Of the 24 assertions in the neurology data, five occurred in
immediate response to a patient’s reported concern or on-
going trouble, and an additional case responded—at some
remove—to the patient’s request for a medication review as
part of her reason for the visit, this being predicated on her
concern about possible side effects.1 Cases included in this
section total 25% of the neurology assertions.
Extract 7a shows an example from a multiple sclerosis
(MS) review. As part of the history-taking (not all data
shown), the patient has revealed that she had a relapse the
previous year, keeping her off work for months. She discloses
several ways in which she has been struggling since then. The
extract begins at the point where the patient is summarising
the pressure she is under (lines 1–2 and 4–5 and 8).
Confirming that this will be affecting her condition (lines 7,
9), the neurologist explains about the relationship between
MS and stress. Although it is difficult to hear what the
neurologist says, the patient’s response reiterates the negative
impact of being busy (lines 20–22). Through a series of ques-
tions just like the preliminaries shown in Barnes (in press),
the neurologist works towards some possible solutions,
centred on obtaining support at work (lines 24, 26, 30).
Having already tried the courses of action implicitly recom-
01  Neu:    .tch No::w (0.1) .hhh in terms of treatment 
02           there’s medication that (0.1) we can prescribe that 
03 (0.1) you can ta::ke if you feel this is coming o:n, 
04 .hhh to stop it (0.2) from (0.2) developing into a >kind of a<
05 full blown headache, 
06      (0.2) 
01  Neu: .hhhh There are also medications for treating the 
02           burning sensations, and- and- and the:: kind of 
03          painful and tight sensations as we:ll,
04       (0.2)
05  Pat: Mhm,
01  Neu:  There a:re medications: (.) that we can prescribe
02           that will help with the tingling?
03  Pat: ((Nods))
1Although we excluded cases where patients overtly initiated a treatment decision-making sequence (see Stivers & Barnes, in press), we included cases
where neurologists considered treatment in response to patients’ reported concerns about symptoms, since proposing treatment as a solution to patients’
troubles is core to the business of medical consultations.
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mended through these questions (see also Shaw, Potter, &
Hepburn, 2015), the patient concludes that there is little to
be done since the job itself cannot be changed (lines 38,
40–42, 45). This leaves an on-going problem, construed as
not solvable through the courses of action introduced by the
neurologist. It is in this context that he produces a turn
containing two assertions: “there are medications that can
help with the sensory symptoms” (lines 46–47, 49), and
“there are medications that can help with the fatigue” (lines
49, 51).
Extract 7a (UK050101401–2; Multiple Sclerosis)
These assertions are poised between doing informing and
doing recommending, following a very similar format to that
in Extract 3. This entails the impersonally formulated
announcement that “there are medications,” followed by the
construction of these as potentially helpful for the patient’s
reported symptoms. The assertions in Extract 7a respond
directly to the patient’s unresolved troubles at work, indicat-
ing that a (potential) solution is—contrary to her expectations
—available. They are thus hearable as recommendation rele-
vant, without overtly directing the patient to take the pro-
ferred treatment. The patient treats this as information only,
producing minimal acknowledgements at lines 48, 50, and 53.
In next turn, the neurologist resumes the on-going activity—
the MS review—with further questioning (shown in Extract
7b, lines 54, 56, 58). Only once this is complete, does he
return to the matter of treatment, producing a mitigated
recommendation in the form of a suggestion (boldface lines
70–71, 73), which the patient accepts at line 75. Through
further discussion (not shown), they ultimately settle on preg-
abalin, following the patient’s announcement that she was
treated (effectively) with this in the past. The neurologist
describes this as a “newer version” of gabapentin, thus making
of this a decision about which form of the drug to take. The
patient readily accepts the recommendation to resume her
previous dose.
Extract 7b (UK050101401–2; Multiple Sclerosis)
The trajectory shown in Extracts 7a-b was common across all
six of the responsive assertions: patients treated these as infor-
mation, responding minimally in five, and with a (delayed)
positive assessment of the information in the sixth; only when
the neurologists went on to make an explicit recommendation
(which occurred in all six), did the patients engage overtly in
decision-making, treating the prior turn asmaking acceptance of
a treatment relevant. This usually occurred at some remove from
the assertion, depending on what activity was underway. For
example, when they were partway through history-taking, the
explicit recommendation was deferred until that was complete.
Thus, these assertion turns handled the interactional relevance of
responding to a patient’s concern with a treatment solution,
while at the same time avoiding setting up—immediately next
—the activity of treatment decision-making. This was achieved
by using a turn design that placed very little pressure on the
patient for an immediate acceptance (see Gill &Maynard, 2006);
minimal acknowledgements were routinely produced and rou-
tinely treated as sufficient for the neurologist to return to the on-
going activity. Assertions can function, then, to delay the deci-
sion point in the service of first completing another activity.
01   Pat:   So:: h. in general l(h)ife i(h)s just really quite heheh 
02          .hhh 
03   Neu: (Ok[ay)
04   Pat:      [rubbish at the moment=and I- I- I- I don’t know if 
05          that’s::: (0.5) affecting
06          (0.4)
07   Neu: It will [be.
08   Pat:           [the symptoms I’ve got, [you know,
09   Neu:           [(      ) It will be.  
11          I mean it’s recog[nised that stress has a 
11   Pat:                  [Mhm
12   Neu: negative effect on MS symptoms=it [tends to make 
13   Pat:   [Yeah.
14   Neu: things worse and (       ) explain(ed) how 
15       [(   ) how (disease) (    [   )
16 Pat: [Yea:h                    [Mhm. 
17 (0.5)
18 Neu: (Er a weakness I think)
19 (0.3)
20 Pat:   I just can’t do:: as much and l(h)ike (0.3) you know 
21 hh. .hh I have a busy da::y (.) at work: (.) and 
22            I’m dead
23 (0.2)
24 Neu: Um:: (.) have you d[isclosed your er (0.2) diagnosis  
25 Pat: [You know?                           
26 Neu: at [work.= (=Are they aware [of it.)
27 Pat:  [Yes:.                   [Mhm 
28 (0.5)
29 Pat:   [Yeah.
30 Neu: [(So) have [you been to occupation[al health,
31 Pat:             [Yeah                  [Yes:.
32 Pat:   And they did a workplace assessment for me 
33            and all that,
34 Neu:  Right.
35 Pat:   So I’ve got them on my side in that [respect.
36 Neu: [Sure, 
37   Neu:  Sure. [(  )
38 Pat:    [But #uh-# (0.6) 
39 Neu:   Oka[y
40 Pat:     [if my job’s AB and C=my job’s AB and C:, 
41 (0.4) and I have busy da:ys (of:)/(I’ve) (0.7) 
42              [you know quieter days, [.hh
43 Neu:   [Sure         [Yeah
44 (0.7)
45 Pat:   [(So) 
46 Neu:   [There a::re (0.3) you know there are 
47              medications [that can he:lp with the::
48 Pat:  [Mhm.
49 Neu: sensory symptoms, an[d there are
50 Pat:            [Yea:h.
51 Neu:   medications that can help with the fati::gue.
52 (0.2)
53 Pat:   Yeah.
54   Neu:   U:m: (0.7) just (0.2) to reca[p, (now) do you drink 
55   Pat:                                [Mhm,
56 Neu:   lots in the way of caffeine? 
57 (0.2)
58 Neu:   Caffei[nated drinks,
59 Pat:         [Oh(h)(h)a- >two or three cups of tea a day<  
60 I don’t (drink)/(take) coffee,
((8 lines omitted in which the neurologist asks about the patient’s intake 
of ‘fizzy drinks’ and explains that these “can sometimes create symptoms”))
69   Neu:  U::m (0.4) the::: (1.1) I think, i- it’s difficult to
70         kno:w (0.4) what to tackle first but I
71              [would suggest possibly:: (0.5) >putting
72 Pat: [Yeah
73 Neu: you on a drug< called <gabapentin?>
74 (0.3)/((possible tongue click))
75 Pat: Okay
4 M. TOERIEN
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Y
or
k]
 at
 02
:20
 29
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Orienting to the patient’s right to choose
A further six of the 24 neurology assertions (25%) were used
to introduce a list of treatment options and/or to introduce
one or more of the options. In an additional eight (33%) cases,
the neurologist initiated a decision about a single treatment
but made it clear that not treating was an option, giving the
patient a potential yes/no choice. This section considers both
a) multiple options and b) yes/no decisions, showing how
assertions can allow neurologists to defer the decision point
in the service of orienting to the patient’s right to choose.
Cases included in this section total 58% (n = 14) of the
neurology assertions.
Multiple option-listing
Extract 8 shows a case where assertions function as part of a
wider trajectory known as “option-listing” (Toerien, Shaw, &
Reuber, 2013). Option-listing typically includes both an
announcement that there are options and a subsequent listing
thereof (often with information about their pros and cons). In
Extract 8, the neurologist self-repairs from naming a particu-
lar tablet (lines 2–3) to setting up a list of options (line 3),
thereby announcing that there is a choice. He goes on to list
the options (bolded lines 4–12). Both the announcement of a
forthcoming list and each of the options are introduced using
the format, “there is/are x,” where x is a generic reference to
treatment (line 3), a specific treatment name (lines 4 and 8),
or a reference to a drug type (line 6).
Extract 8 (UK050207201; Diagnosis not yet confirmed
(awaiting scans) but patient experiencing symptoms described
by neurologist as “neuropathic pain”)
In setting up a list, the neurologist projects that there is
a decision to be made, but that the decision point is to be
deferred until all options have been described. As shown
in the previous section, the assertion format readily
achieves this deferral by virtue of being treatable as “just
informing”. Patients can thus respond minimally to the
initiating assertion—for example, the nod in Extract 8,
line 5—without being seen to be resistant to treatment.
Furthermore, the relative neutrality of the assertion format
allows the neurologist to list each treatment in a way that,
at least to some extent, poses each as a viable option. For
instance, in Extract 8, each option is framed impersonally
(“there is/are”), thereby holding back from an overt
recommendation for one over another. At the same time,
the neurologist makes a link between the options and the
Patient’s complaints, highlighting the potential benefit. He
also positions the options as clinically endorsed—through
the institutional “we” (line 3) and the claim that these
tablets are in common use for pain (lines 1–3). Thus,
while efforts are made to produce all the options as legit-
imate, there is a slant in favour of treatment of some kind.
Nevertheless, as long as the listing is on-going, the patient
can produce minimal responses (lines 5, 9, 14) without
being heard to be resistant—precisely because the con-
struction of a list defers the relevance of the decision
itself.
How the decision point was constructed varied consider-
ably across our option-listing cases. Notably, these ranged
with respect to how “open” the decision was (Reuber et al.,
2015; Toerien, Shaw, Duncan, & Reuber, 2011). In some, the
neurologist positioned the decision as lying entirely in the
patient’s domain. For example, following extensive informa-
tion provision regarding migraine treatment options (data not
shown), the neurologist in Extract 9 explicitly seeks the
patient’s preference (shaded turn, lines 9–10).
Extract 9 (UK060601601; Migraine)
Extract 10 also shows a turn in which the neurologist seeks
the patient’s view on treatment (see line 6). In both cases, the
assertion turn itself occurred at some remove from the deci-
sion point, with extensive information provision about the
treatment options occurring in between (data not shown).
They differ, however, in the extent to which the neurologist
is willing to provide his view. In Extract 9, the neurologist
seeks the patient’s preference (lines 9–10) after explicitly
excluding himself from the decision (see boldface lines 3, 6).
By contrast, in Extract 10, the neurologist seeks the patient’s
view after voicing his own: “I think we should consider…
disease modifying therapies” (boldface lines 5–6). Although
cautiously worded, this is a clear bid for treatment, backed up
with the treatment-relevant diagnostic announcement that the
patient appears to “have had a further relapse” (line 4).
Extract 10 (UK050208201; MS)
01  Neu:   U:m in the meantime for your pa::in um (0.2) 
02             (you-/you’c-) (0.7) .tc.hh u::m (0.2) there’s a tablet 
03             ca:lled <there’re a couple of tablets that we often u::se=
04             [There’s one called (.) gabapentin. [.hhh u:h=and
05  Pat:     [((slight nod)) [((nods))
06 Neu: there’s one- <which is an antiepileptic drug but 
07 (0.3) it’s quite good for neuropathic pain.
08  =.hh[h There’s one called amitriptyline=
09 Pat:  [U h u h
10  Neu:    =which is an (0.2) o:ld type of antidepressant 
11 (0.2) but again it’s quite helpful fo:r um 
12 neuropathic type of pain.
13 (0.1)
14 Pat:   Yea:h.
01   Neu:  So::: (0.4) that’s how they work. 
02         (2.8)
03 Neu:  [And that’s rea:lly my job done.
04   Pat:  [((visibly gearing up to speak)) 
05         (0.1)
06   Neu:  At [that point.
07   Pat:    [Okay
08         (0.2)
09   Neu:  I have to >sort=of pass it back to you and say what 
10        do you< want?
01   Neu:  And you’ve got further symptoms now, which are 
02             not too  severe at the moment. [But- but it- it looks 
03   Pat: [Yeah, right.
04   Neu:  to me that you have had a further (.) relapse, and
05            I think we should consider um what we call as 
06 disease modifying therapie:s. .hh h- Have you
07 had any thou:ght about that.
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It is not the case, then, that assertions—and the informa-
tion that typically follows them—avoid conveying anything of
the neurologist’s stance towards the options. The impersonal
framing notwithstanding, this stance can become evident both
through the design of the list and the way in which the patient
is (and, sometimes, is not) given a chance to express his/her
view. Rather, the analysis shows how the delicate balancing
act that assertions perform—poised between informing and
recommending—can be used to defer decision-making. That
deferral is done here in the service of offering choice (however
tilted in a particular direction that choice might be). By
asserting both that there is more than one option, and then
using assertions to list the options, neurologists can deliver
extended information as a basis for decision-making, while
holding back both from an overt recommendation and from
placing interactional pressure on the patient for an “active”
response to each option. This, then, sets up the possibility for
the patient, subsequently, to choose from those options that
have been introduced.
Yes/no choice
Assertions were also used to set up the possibility of a yes/no
choice for the patient, as shown in Extract 11. The extract begins
partway through a wider decision-making activity. Having
received overt acceptance of a recommendation against disease-
modifying therapy (data not shown), the neurologist marks a
shift to a second issue: her “taking things easy” (lines 1–2). The
patient’s difficulty with fatigue was implicitly introduced near
the start of the consultation, through her claim to be feeling
better after reducing her activities (not shown). At lines 1–2, the
neurologist picks up on this, seeking confirmation that she is
“not working at the moment.” The patient responds with an
account of her difficulties at work and her decision to take time
off (not shown). The neurologist pursues this through a series of
questions, which address the symptom of fatigue. The last of
these—like those analysed in Barnes (in press)—checks whether
the patient has already received treatment for the problems she
has described (lines 26–27). When her response (lines 28, 30)
clears the way for a recommendation on the grounds that she has
not received treatment, the neurologist produces the focal asser-
tion turn. This appears to be tied back to his prior question
through the use of “because” (line 31), making this an account
for the prior question, although this is not clearly audible.
The assertion is framed using the now familiar formu-
lation, “there are x,” where x is a generic reference to
“certain drugs” (line 31). This turn, once again, is poised
between an informing and a recommendation. The imper-
sonal framing presents this as information about the exis-
tence of treatment rather than as a recommendation that
this patient ought to take the treatment. At the same time,
the claim that this treatment “can help” (lines 31–32) the
patient’s reported symptom—which has just been
described as getting in the way of her work—tilts this in
favour of treatment. Responding to the assertion, the
patient does no more than receipt the information (line
33), this time with a continuer, indicating her understand-
ing that more is to come (Schegloff, 1981). The neurolo-
gist continues with more “informing,” explaining both the
nature of fatigue in MS and how its treatment can help
improve the patient’s symptoms (lines 34–44). This infor-
mation is clearly tilted in favour of treatment—evident
especially in the increment, which upgrades the neurolo-
gist’s claim from “Can improve these symptoms” to “Can
improve these symptoms. Quite significantly” (line 42 and
44). Throughout, however, the patient produces either
continuers or minimal receipts (bolded lines 33, 36, 38,
40, 43, 45), thereby not treating the decision itself as
relevant yet.
Extract 11 (UK50100201; Multiple Sclerosis)
01  Neu:     U::m (0.6) no:w in terms of (0.4) taking things: easy,
02           you’re not working at the moment,
((23 lines omitted during which they establish the kinds of difficulties the patient was 
eperiencing))
26  Neu:     And- (0.2) have you been given any medication 
27           to help with the fati::gue.
28  Pat:     [No-
29  Neu:     [at this stage.
30  Pat:     N[o::.    
31  Neu:I    [(Becau-) (0.5) there a::re certain drugs that can 
32          I   he:lp, (0.5) with fati::gue.
33  Pat:     Mhm[::,
34  Neu:        [(two syllables)) (be-) (0.2) ºe-º (  ) fatigue’s 
35           a very common symptom e- in MS, [and it’s 
36  Pat:                            [(Ri:ght)
37  Neu:     not just physical fatigue=it’s- [(.) cognitive fatigue 
38  Pat:                            [Mhm:
39  Neu:        as well. 
40  Pat:     Ri:[ght,
41 Neu:        [.hhh And sometimes just by treating the fatigue. 
42 Ca[n  impro:ve these symptom[s.    
43 Pat: [Mhm.                                  [Yeah
44  Neu: Quite significantly.
45 Mhm[:,
46  Neu:                 [.hh (‘nd there are a few) medications that we 
47      II    can try (0.2) to try and achieve that=’s that something 
48      II    that would interest you.
49 Pat:     Ye↑::s uhuh,
50 (0.3)    
51 Neu:     Okay. .Hhh The one we use initially >is a< drug called
52 amantadine,
53 (0.4)
54 Pat:     [Mhm
55  Neu:     [and you take it basically first thing in the morning, 
56 (0.3) 
57 [you don’t take it later in the day: (0.2) [(well not 
58 Pat:     [Mhm                                       [Right
59 Neu:     initially at least) because it keeps you awake.
((23 lines omitted during which neurologist explains how to take 
the drug and possible side effects)) 
83 Neu:    Sometimes people can feel a bit nauseous or 
84 sometimes people can get headaches.
85 Pat:    Right. Ok[ay,
86 Neu:    [E::r(m) but in >general it< either works or
87 it doesn’t work. 
88 Pat: O[kay,
89 Neu: [It works for about fifty to sixty per cent of people 
90 with MS related fatigue.
91 Pat:     Righ[t. Okay, 
92 Neu:         [.Hhhh I think it’s worth tryin[g.
93 Pat:  [Ok↑ay,
94 (.)
95 Neu:     There are a couple of other things that we use b’t  
96 (.) this is kind [of  (0.4) the best >kind of< and the 
97 Pat:                 [Mhm 
98 Neu:     safest treatment to use (than [the rest of them)
99 Pat:                                [Right. Oka:y [that’s 
100 Neu:                                  [.HHhh 
101 Pat:     fi:ne
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A decision point is produced in an on-record fashion only
at lines 47–48, where the neurologist reissues the assertion,
still framed with the impersonal “there are x” format and
done with the generic reference form (“a few medications”).
This second version includes more endorsement through the
more personalised part of the turn: “that we can try to try and
achieve that” (compare with “that can help with fatigue,” lines
31–32). However, the neurologist quickly adds a question to
the patient (lines 47–48). This pulls back from the upgraded
deontic force, making relevant the patient’s announcement of
whether she wants to try the treatment. Like the decision
points shown in Extracts 10 and 11, the turn marked as →II
in Extract 12 explicitly orients to the patient’s right to choose.
In response, the patient gives the go-ahead (Schegloff, 2007)
for the neurologist to recommend treatment more fully. This
he does by providing further recommendation-relevant infor-
mation, now naming a specific drug (line 52), and explaining
how to take it (lines 55–59), its potential side effects (lines
83–84), and its likelihood of working (lines 86–90). This
assumes the patient will start treatment. In that sense, lines
51–90 may be seen as a recommendation for amantadine,
specifically. However, the neurologist also goes one step
further, producing a personal endorsement of the drug (line
92) and an account for recommending it (lines 95–96, 98).
Only then does the patient produce an explicit acceptance:
“Okay” (line 93) and “Okay that’s fine” (lines 99, 101), despite
having given the go-ahead at line 49.
This was consistent across the neurology assertions—
explicit, immediate acceptance was never done in next
turn (i.e. line 33 in Extract 11), even when the patient
went on to accept treatment (apparently quite readily)
later in the decision-making trajectory. Extract 11 illustrates
this, showing that the minimal responses across lines 33–45
do not appear to be related to forthcoming resistance to
treatment. In some cases, patients did actively resist treat-
ment following the neurologist’s orientation to their right to
choose. In these, the same pattern shown in Extract 11 was
also typically evident: an assertion containing a generic
reference to treatment (see →I), minimally receipted; a
subsequent orientation to the patient’s right to choose
whether to undergo treatment (see →II); a go-ahead or
blocking response, followed by a recommendation tailored
to that response (see lines 51–98). In other words, where the
patient’s response blocked the option to treat, the subse-
quent recommendation was typically against treatment; only
on two occasions did the neurologist pursue agreement to
treat in the face of such resistance.
In this respect, these assertions function similarly to those
used in option-listing. Poised somewhere between an inform-
ing and a recommendation, the assertions allow for the con-
struction of a wider decision-making trajectory by placing
very little interactional pressure on the patient for an immedi-
ate acceptance of the just-mentioned treatment. Like in
option-listing, this defers the decision point proper until two
things have been done: the delivery of recommendation-
relevant information and the creation of a slot for the patient,
explicitly, to position him/herself for or against treatment.
Again, the information delivered by the neurologist is not
neutral with respect to that decision. But the trajectory allows
the neurologist both to construct her/himself as knowing best
about the available treatments and their potential benefit and
to construct the patient as knowing best about her/his treat-
ment preferences. And again, as in option-listing, the asser-
tion can be done to help facilitate—for yes/no treatment
decisions—a degree of patient choice.
“Cautious” recommendations
This final analytic section examines four cases (15%) that are
notably different to the rest in their turn design. In each, the
neurologist refers to a single, named treatment as a standalone
option, as shown in boldface in Extracts 12–15. In the rest of
the neurology assertions, treatments were only named when
they were part of a wider multi-option list. Apart from the
four below, all the assertions that referred only to yes/no
decisions used generic references (e.g. “medication(s)” in
Extracts 4, 5, 6 and 7a; “drugs” in Extract 11).
Extract 12 (UK50208202; Multiple Sclerosis) - also shown
as Extract 2
Extract 13 (UK50203802; Migraines)
Extract 14 (UK50208203; Multiple Sclerosis - audio only)
Extract 15 (UK50207101; Postural tremors)
The neurologist is arguably more clearly hearable as
doing recommending when naming a treatment since gen-
eric references do not make clear what, precisely, the
patient might accept/resist in next turn. Nevertheless, in
three of the four cases shown above (Extracts 12–14), the
patients responded minimally or not at all to the assertion,
even though all three went on to accept the treatment. In
other words, despite the different treatment formulation,
these assertions seem—like those in the previous sections
—to be treated, typically, as simply doing informing.
Again, then, the assertion seems to defer the decision
point proper. This can be seen in Extract 16, which
shows the wider decision-making trajectory for the case
shown in Extract 12. In common with all the cases in this
final sub-collection, the decision is only reached after a
full, on-record recommendation is made (lines 6–8). Thus,
01  Neu:  Um .tchh (0.8) m- (0.5) .tch ss- (.) the steroids ca:n be 
02        helpful in terms of an acute rela::pse::. 
01  Neu: You’ve tried other pro- prophylactic medications for
02      migraines in [ t h e    ] past
03  Pat:   [Mm hmm]
04  Neu: I see you haven’t tried a tablet called topiramate
05  Pat: Right
06  Neu: (Now/er) it’s an anti-epileptic drug (0.3) but we use it 
07       also for migraines in a <smaller dose>
01 Neu: .hh (well/we’ll) um (0.4) .tch (0.4) if the propranolol 
02 is h- not helping your heada:ches (0.1) >there’s< .hh 
03 >there’s=a< tablet called amitriptyline, >which is a< 
04 (0.4) o:ld type of antidepressant. 
01  Neu: U::m, .hhh (0.2) generally the treatment for 
02        that is:(.) with er::m  (0.8) a: (.) tablet called 
03        beta (.) blocker,
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the decision sequence includes the assertion (lines 1–2),
which is not receipted vocally (we only have an audio
recording so cannot be sure if anything occurred non-
vocally), and a recommendation (lines 6–8), which is
accepted (line 9).
Extract 16 (UK050208202; Multiple Sclerosis) – a continuation
of Extract 12
The final case (Extract 17) is atypical in that the patient
responds with active resistance. He does so on the grounds
that he believes that he is already taking a beta-blocker (or
something similar). This is perhaps due to the neurologist’s
description of it being used for high blood pressure (lines 3–4),
a condition for which the patient has already said he is being
treated (data not shown). Thus, despite the general construction
of the assertion turn (“generally the treatment for that is…”, lines
3–5) and the provision of additional information about the
typical use of such a tablet (line 3), the patient treats the assertion
as conveying a specific recommendation for himself. This is
evident in the way his resistance is personalised and specific
(“I’m taking simvastatin,” lines 6–7). This case thus supports
the finding, in primary care, that assertions may be treated as
doing recommending (Stivers et al., in press).
Extract 17 (UK050207101; Postural tremors)– a continua-
tion of Extract 15
The neurologist’s pursuit of agreement by the patient to take a
beta-blocker—across lines 9–19—ratifies the patient’s
understanding of the assertion as a recommendation. This is
evident in the neurologist’s treatment of the patient’s turn as
resistant. First, he counters the patient’s resistance by correcting
his misclassification of simvastatin as a beta-blocker (lines 9–11),
which the patient accepts (line 12). Second, in correcting his own
claim that the patient is not already taking a beta-blocker (“well
you’re on atenolol,” line 11), the neurologist produces another
assertion, this time naming a specific beta-blocker (“propranolol,”
line 16) and providing an account forwhy itmight bemore helpful
than the one the patient is taking (lines 16–19). In so doing, he
justifies the treatment on the grounds of its likely benefit to the
patient. Finally, the neurologist produces an explicit recommenda-
tion in the form of a proposal (lines 21, 22), which the patient
accepts. The neurologist’s response to the patient’s resistant turn at
lines 6–7 thus exposes the implicit recommendation produced
through the assertion at lines 1–4, ratcheting up the interactional
pressure for acceptance. The patient’s response shifts from non-
vocal
acknowledgment (line 20) to more explicit acceptance (line 23).
Putting the resistance to one side, we see the same two-step pattern
shown in Extract 16: an assertion in which a specific treatment or
type of treatment is named (see→I), followed by an overt recom-
mendation (see→II). This occurred in all four cases.
So what’s going on in these four? These assertions function, it
can be argued, as highly mitigated, or deontically “cautious,”
recommendations. In that respect, they resemble the yes/no
cases shown in the previous section. However, whereas the
cautiousness in those cases opened up space for an explicit
orientation to the patient’s right to choose, in these cases, it
opens up space for handling a variety of difficulties with respect
to the decision. In Extract 16, the assertion can be heard as
persuasive, just as the subsequent question (lines 3–4) may be
heard as implying a need for treatment. Thus, before acceptance
becomes overtly relevant from the patient, the neurologist has
made a case for the treatment. This seems to be predicated on the
possibility that this patient may resist steroids. Earlier in the
consultation, it became clear that the MS nurse had already
recommended steroids, but that the patient has not taken any.
Thus, the cautiousness here appears to be handling this indicator
of reluctance.
Reasons for a cautious approach to recommending were
evident in all four cases. Just prior to Extract 17, the neurol-
ogist reports a degree of uncertainty about the diagnosis, to be
resolved with further testing. Thus, the generalised assertion
(“generally the treatment for that is…”, lines 1–2) serves to
indicate a treatment option that is uncertain, dependent on
the outcome of the tests. In the other two cases, the patients
had already tried treatments that had not been effective. Thus,
the assertions introduce alternatives against this backdrop of
treatment failure. In all cases, then, there is reason for a
deontically cautious approach to the action of recommending
a particular drug. Again, the assertion’s delicate balance
between informing and recommending helps to minimise
the pressure on the patient for an immediate acceptance,
deferring the decision point until further treatment-relevant
information provision (and sometimes information gathering)
has been done. Unlike in the prior cases, however, the goal
here seems to be the “step-wise” building of a case for treat-
ment, rather than the construction of a choice.
01  Neu: I   Um .tchh (0.8) m- (0.5) .tch ss- (.) the steroids
02 I ca:n be helpful in terms of  an acute rela::pse::.
03                   Um .hh your- your symptoms have been going on 
04                   for the last month or two?
05 Pat:     Yeah.
06 Neu: II  Um, we could try (.) a course of high dose oral
07 II  steroids (.) and it may give you some (.) temporary 
08                     relief?
09 Pat:      Yeah.
((Neurologist moves on to discuss disease modifying therapy, treating the 
decision about steroids as made.))
01  Neu: I U::m, .hhh (0.2) generally the treatment for
02       I that is:(.) with er::m  (0.8) a: (.) tablet called 
03        I beta (.) blocker,=>which is< .hh often used
04 fo:r (0.3) high blood pressure or other heart
05                   condition[s=and
06 Pat:                         [I’m  taking=
07                   {well I’m taking [e::r simvastatin?
{((Patient gestures towards notes))
08 Neu:                              [(  ) ((Neu starts looking 
through notes))
09   Neu:      Well that’s:: (0.1) that’s  (there) (c-) for (.) 
10 cholesterol,= you’re not on {any: (0.2)
{((Neu gestures at notes))
11 Neu:       beta-blo[cker- well you’re on atenolol so (0.2)  
12   Pat:          [(Oh) ((and nods))
14 Neu:      that- (0.3) that ca:n be helpful=>but< .hhh gen-
15 u::m (0.3) .tch (0.6) it- (0.5) a tablet called
16 propranolol which is: (0.8) less spe[cific: (.) to the 
17 Pat:                 [((little nod))                       
18 Neu:      hea:rt and it- (0.3) it works:: in your brain
19                   [as=well .hh can be more help[fu:l.  
20 Pat:         [((little nod)) [((nods))
21 Neu: II .hhh Er so maybe: (0.1) we could swap 
22 Neu: II  it for the atenolo:l. [.hhh The- (0.9) because 
23 Pat: [Yea:h.
24 Neu:      you are on the blood pressure tablets: (0.5) it-
25 (1.4) when you get up qu- quickly… 
((moves onto another concern raised earlier))
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Discussion
This paper has shown that assertions, at least in the UK
neurology collection, are overwhelmingly receipted as doing
nothing more than information provision. This is made pos-
sible by their ambiguous design: on the one hand, their
relatively depersonalised formats convey that the neurologist
is “merely” informing the patient about what’s available; on
the other, the link made between the available treatment and
the patient’s condition implies that it will benefit the patient.
Thus, assertions, while they stop short of explicitly telling the
patient what s/he ought to do, are hearable as recommenda-
tion relevant. This delicate balance leaves it up to the patient
whether to orient, in response, to the implied action (recom-
mending) or the on-record action (informing). In that regard,
assertions function in a similar way to the illness explanations
(Gill & Maynard, 2006) and the declarative evaluations
(Kushida & Yamakawa, 2015) discussed in the introduction,
above.
When treated by the patient as doing “mere” informing,
assertions defer the decision point until something more has
been done by the neurologist. The analysis presented here has
demonstrated three main interactional functions served by
this delay. First, in responsive position, they can be used to
address patient concerns—indicating that a solution does exist
—without actively making a decision relevant next. In this
way, they can avoid derailing another on-going activity (e.g.
history-taking). This parallels Gill and Maynard’s (2006) ana-
lysis, which showed that, by avoiding direct questions to the
doctor, patients can get candidate explanations on the table
without disrupting the doctor’s information-gathering activ-
ity. Doctors, reciprocally, usually choose not to topicalise the
explanations during that activity, allowing them to “stay on
course” with respect to the overall organisation of the visit
(p. 117).
Second, this paper has shown that assertions can be used
to construct both multi-option and yes/no choices for the
patient. For the former, assertions may be used to announce
that there are multiple options and to introduce one or more
of the options from which the patient might choose.
Similarly, for yes/no decisions, they can defer the decision
point until two things have been done: the delivery of
recommendation-relevant information and the creation of a
slot for the patient, explicitly, to position him/herself for or
against treatment. Typically, the neurologist then went on to
align with the patient’s view in how s/he designed the
recommendation proper. However, it should be emphasised
that, across this second subset, the extent to which the
alternatives were equally endorsed by the neurologist varied
considerably. These assertions were not, then, typically used
to offer entirely “open” decisions for patients; they did all,
however, facilitate a clear orientation by the neurologists to
the patients’ right to choose.
Third, this paper showed that assertions can be used to
construct a “step-wise” approach to the recommendation,
where the assertion is followed by a more explicit recom-
mending turn. This seems to handle various reasons for cau-
tion, including diagnostic uncertainty, the likelihood of
patient resistance, and uncertain efficacy of the proffered
drug. These cases are akin to the declarative evaluations dis-
cussed by Kushida and Yamakawa (2015), who showed that
the decision proper may be delayed if the proposal either has
an obscure relationship to the patient’s stated concern or is
based on a diagnosis that differs from the patient’s under-
standing of their condition.
Although the sample size is too small to be confident about
the generalisability of the patterns identified here, it is intri-
guing to consider the possibility that whether or not a treat-
ment is named in an assertion may be critical to whether the
neurologist is hearably initiating a recommendation trajectory
or an opportunity for patient choice. All the initiating asser-
tions (i.e. excluding those that were responsive to patient
concerns) showed the same correlation between reference
form and subsequent action: when a specific treatment or
type of treatment was named (see →I in Extracts 16 and
17), then the neurologist went on to produce an overt recom-
mendation (see →II); when treatment was referred to gener-
ically (see→I in Extract 11), the neurologist went on to orient
to the patient’s right to choose (see →II). This implies that
assertions—described here as poised between recommending
and informing—may lie along a continuum, ranging from
most like a recommendation to most like “mere” information
provision. The analysis presented here suggests that the refer-
ence form can push the assertion more towards one or the
other end of the continuum, but it seems likely that other
features of the turn design will play a role too. This warrants
further research.
In all the neurology cases, assertions played both an episte-
mic (see Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) and deontic (see Stevanovic &
Peräkylä, 2012) role: they enabled the delivery of treatment-
relevant information while placing minimal interactional pres-
sure on the patient for an active response. In that regard, they
are deontically mitigated relative to the other action forms
discussed in Stivers et al. (in press). Nevertheless, depending
on how the information is delivered, they can be done in the
service of seeking—in various ways—to persuade the patient of
the benefits of treatment, in advance of the recommendation
proper. Comparable persuasive moves have been demonstrated
by previous studies of how treatment recommendations may be
“pre-figured.” For example, Silverman (1981) showed how,
despite an apparent emphasis on parents’ preferences, paedia-
tric cardiology consultations for children with Down’s syn-
drome almost always ended in a decision that accorded with
clinic policy (not to treat). He showed how this was subtly
achieved across the course of the consultation, through a series
of moves that laid the groundwork for non-intervention (see
also Clark & Hudak, 2011). Similarly, in their analysis of a
“pressured decision” in psychiatry, Quirk, Chaplin, Lelliott,
and Seale (2011, p. 99) showed how the psychiatrist pushed
for an acceptance of medication through a series of preliminary
questions. It is notable that these questions were preceded by
an informing—“You know olanzapine isn’t the only drug?”
(line 1, p. 100)—which, although not done as an assertion, is
comparable in that it introduces the possibility of another
treatment without expressly recommending it. A series of
papers investigating surgeons’ recommendations for and
against surgery likewise showed that surgeons may work to
“‘get the patient on board’” with their preferred course of
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action before delivering the recommendation proper (Hudak,
Clark, & Raymond, 2011, p. 1036, and see; Clark & Hudak,
2011).
A similar argument could be made for some of the cases
included in our sample—most clearly those in which a specific
treatment is named in the assertion turn. Like Barnes (in
press), this paper thus contributes to an understanding of
the work clinicians may do—in advance of the recommenda-
tion proper—to try to secure acceptance or reduce resistance.
However, previous studies have seldom considered the ways
in which explicit moments of choice may be generated for
patients. In the neurology data, the majority of assertions were
used to initiate a decision-making trajectory that included just
such a moment. Although information provision prior to a
moment of choice is rarely (if ever) neutral—and thus can
also be hearably persuasive—information is a prerequisite for
valid decision-making. Thus, the informing done through
assertions can also be understood as a means of providing
patients with (some of) the epistemic resources needed to
make a choice. Without such resources, patients demonstrably
struggle to choose, as we have shown elsewhere (Reuber et al.,
2015). Assertions can, then, handle an interactional dilemma:
how to reduce the epistemic gradient between clinician and
patient (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) while avoiding directly telling
the patient what to do.
This study is clearly limited both with respect to sample
size and the focus only on neurology assertions. Further
research should test these findings in larger datasets and
across other settings. Nevertheless, the analysis presented
here suggests two likely reasons for the large number of
assertions in neurology compared with primary care. First,
neurologists may be more likely to be prescribing treat-
ments with which patients could not be assumed to be
familiar (unlike, say, antibiotics in primary care in the UK
and US). Thus, information provision as a basis for deci-
sion-making may be more commonly deemed to be neces-
sary in neurology. Second, there is a strong emphasis on
patient choice in the policy literature for neurology within
the National Health Service in the UK (see Department of
Health, 2000, 2005, 2007). Given that assertions were most
commonly part of decision-making trajectories oriented to
patient choice, this emphasis in UK neurology may partly
account for their prevalence in our sample. Why this
should not, similarly, be the case in UK psychiatry is not
yet known. However, given the finding that assertions
were generally treated as recommendations in the primary
care datasets, it seems likely that they are not being used
(or not often being used) to generate a slot for patient
choice in primary care. Assertions may, then, be one of
the ways in which neurologists are seeking to enact the
call to enable patients with chronic conditions to “become
key decision-makers in the treatment process”
(Department of Health, 2000, p. 5).
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